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Abstract Afghanistan has long been backward and
underdeveloped where centuries of desertification,
deforestation, overgrazing and environmental degra-
dation have combined with successive invasions,
violence, and terrorism to reduce the population to
abject poverty. In the post 9/11 world, development of
Afghanistan is seen as the only hope to revive the failed
nation and reduce its threat to the external world. New
assessments of natural resources offer many solutions
to old problems of development and the potential
economic functionality through renewal of the col-
lapsed state. Oil, gas, copper, iron, gemstones, and a
number of other resources, combined with a renewed
transportation grid, offer a viable solution that is now
underway to possibly produce a somewhat more
promising future, providing that corruption, renewed
violence, and environmental despoliation can be kept
to a minimum.
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Introduction
Afghanistan was never a developed country or a place
of enlightenment, but at least in the pre-war years of
the 1960s and 1970s a number development projects
there were reasonably successful in the Cold-War
confrontation between the Soviets and the West
(Dupree 1973; Rsanayagam 2003). The subsequent
quarter century of conflict involved the well-known
communist coup, Soviet invasion, Mujahideen coun-
ter-insurgency, Soviet defeat and withdrawal, civil
war, repressive Taliban takeover, Al Qaeda terrorism,
and a new invasion by the Western Coalition led by
the USA (Bearden 2001; Bradsher 1983; Coll 2004;
Crile 2003; Goodson 2001; Rashid 2001; Rubin
1995). In the immediate post 9/11 world great
sympathy was given to the USA by many of the
world’s people who condemned the horrific attacks.
Calls for the reconstruction and renewed robust
development of Afghanistan to alleviate future prob-
lems have been equally strong (Jennings 2003;
Shroder 2003, 2004), but the results have been rather
lackluster and the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies
have reemerged as an increasingly potent force
(Anonymous 2004; Danner 2005; United Nations
2006; Walsh 2006; Rohde and Sanger 2007). By late
2007 new reports on ongoing and emerging problems
from authoritative sources (Moreau et al. 2006; Patel
and Ross 2007; Bergen 2007a,b) indicated that
Afghanistan was at a new tipping point; such that if
more progress was not made soon, the future of any
J. Shroder (&)
Geography & Geology, University of Nebraska at Omaha,





reconstitution of the failed state was seen as poten-
tially unlikely. This paper is a review of some of
these problems and possible solutions.
During the Soviet–Afghanistan War in the 1980s, a
number of papers were published on the role of natural
resources in the conflict (Shroder 1980a,b, 1981, 1982,
1983, 1987; 1989a; Shroder and Assifi 1987). With the
departure of the defeated Soviets in 1988–89, the use of
the relatively rich natural resource base in the rebuild-
ing of war-torn Afghanistan became more focused
(Shroder and Watrel 1992). In a major study for
USAID the Nathan–Berger (Nathan Associates &
Louis Berger International, Inc. Afghanistan mineral
resources study, Nathan Associates Inc., unpublished
report for USAID, 1991) report emphasized three main
strategic approaches to the development of the
resource sector in Afghanistan:
• A ‘national’ or inward-oriented strategy for
domestic needs.
• A ‘regional’ strategy for nearby countries.
• An ‘international’ strategy to serve world
markets.
The regional and international strategies required a
pipeline and possibly a railroad, noting especially that
the international strategy was potentially the most
encompassing and included the major targets of coal,
natural gas, iron ore, copper ore, other ores, and
gemstones that had the potential of producing consid-
erable financial gain for rebuilding the country. Instead
however, Afghanistan was abandoned by the USA and
left to the Taliban and al Qaeda so that no further
development occurred and the 9/11 conspiracy had
freedom to grow to malignant fruition. Following the
invasion of Afghanistan by the coalition forces in 2001,
renewed interest in the role of natural resources in
rebuilding the country reemerged (Shroder 2003, 2004).
Initial problems with reconstruction
and redevelopment
At the outset after the successful invasion of Afghan-
istan, early recognition came that reconstruction and
redevelopment of the country were essential to keep
Taliban and al Qaeda from remerging (Ignatieff 2002).
Afghans are quite pragmatic, so they were expected to
wait and see what the invaders would do that might be
of benefit to them; if it was to be insufficient, then al
Qaeda would win another victory as big as 9/11
(Shroder 2002a,b). It was also noted that the military
invasion of Afghanistan was relatively easy, with
plenty of money available to accomplish the task. On
the other hand, research efforts required to initiate
redevelopment of the country was far more difficult
and without significant funding. The War on Terrorism
in Afghanistan was viewed as not over, it hadn’t started
substantively. The warlords and Taliban hadn’t evap-
orated; just bided their time as the invaders settled in.
Success in the War on Terrorism in that part of the
world clearly would require vigilance, patience, study,
and money. In early summer of 2002 the portents did
not appear optimistic, especially because President
Bush had already famously discounted nation building
as a viable option, when it was patently obvious that
nation building would be required for Afghanistan to
rise from its ashes. ‘‘Nation building lite,’’ the idea that
empires come heavy, or not at all, as the Bush
administration tried to reconstruct Afghanistan on the
cheap (Ignatieff 2002), led to the prospect of potential
failure early on, and the news has only been getting
worse since (Shroder 2003; Fallows 2004; Danner
2005; Chayes 2006; Scheuer 2006; Rubin 2007;
Bergen 2007a,b), as incompetent mistake is piled upon
disastrous error (Bergen 2007c).
Even the best intentions of competent military
advisors (Millen 2005) to legitimize the central
government in the eyes of the Afghan people, develop
positive media campaigns, stop opium production, and
invest heavily in the military-based, provincial recon-
struction teams (PRTs), were leavened by advice to
remain cognizant of the ever-present Afghan propen-
sity for xenophobia, regionalism and conflict.
Furthermore, the concomitant predilection for graft
and corruption at almost all levels in Afghanistan were
also viewed as potentially overwhelming problems that
would adversely impact development of the country
(Delesgues and Torabi 2007).
New and promising natural resource development
potentials
But lest anyone give up on Afghanistan too soon,
there have been faint signs of progress in some
quarters (Shroder 2004). In spite of alarmingly
inadequate funding (only *$5 million given out of
some $70 million requested originally), the U.S.
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Geological Survey (USGS), in collaboration with
the British Geological Survey (BGS) and the
revived Afghanistan Geological Survey (AGS),
was tasked with a host of new assessments of oil,
gas, coal, minerals, water resources, and seismic
hazards, as well as geospatial infrastructure devel-
opment and institutional capacity building. The
original pre-war geological and mineral resource
maps and reports on Afghanistan were updated and
made freely available (Orris and Bliss 2002;
Doebrich and Wahl 2006; Peters 2007), unlike the
semi-secret nature of much of this work in the
hands of the several hundred Soviet geologists who
worked on it during the Cold War (Shroder
1980a,b, 1981, 1982, 1987, 1989a; Shroder and
Assifi 1987; Shroder and Watrel 1992).
No one would have been surprised if not much had
come of this new resource assessment. But by March
2006, geology took center stage in the northern
reaches of Afghanistan where risk, reward and the
potential creation of a new market place all hung in
the balance as the USGS identified undiscovered oil
reserves 18 times the amount originally thought to be
possible and three times the natural gas prospects
(Anonymous 2006a; Klett et al. 2006; Wandry et al.
2006; Blake 2006) (Fig. 1). Furthermore, the privati-
zation of the Jawzjan (Province) Field (Fig. 2) was
announced, which incentive could auger well for
future ‘wildcat’ hydrocarbon discoveries, providing
that the endemic corruption is not allowed to flourish
alongside as well. To the prognosticators of the oil
patch, this could be auspicious for industrial growth
Fig. 1 Natural-color image mosaic of Afghanistan from
Landsat Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (ETM+) data (after
Davis and Hare 2007). Main paved highways in gray. The
highway in black is the incomplete ring road, now little more
than a rough track through the loess hills of the northwest. The
proposed natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan in Central
Asia, across western Afghanistan through Spin Baldak to
Pakistan is in thin white. Major resource deposits of copper
(Cu) are at Aynak (A), iron (Fe) at Haji Gak, and oil and gas
(O & G) in the northwest. B––Bagram; G––Ghazni; H––Hirat
(Herat); Kb––Kabul; Kn––Kandahar; J––Jalalabad; Ma––
Mazar-i-Sharif; Mi––Mimana; P––Panshir Valley; S––Surobi;
SP––Salang Pass
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in Afghanistan, providing multinational oil compa-
nies or other nearby governments could be enticed
into a drilling and production program. The govern-
ments of Pakistan, India and China were all reported
to be interested, and in negotiations. Of course for
any real production to begin, sufficient security must
be guaranteed so that real success would be reason-
ably certain.
In another resource arena, only thirty km south of
Kabul the world-class Aynak copper deposit (Fig. 1)
has been assessed (BGS n.d; Anonymous 2006b) with
various preliminary but laudatory reports of a min-
imum of at least 240 Mt of 2.3% grade ore, which is a
high figure. The USGS (Peters et al. 2007) estimated
the Aynak deposit to have a greater tonnage of lower
grade ore, but even so, some 11,330,000 metric tons
of Cu were thought to be recoverable. With the
world-market price of copper currently so high, the
potential for development of the Aynak deposit is
thought to be robust. In November, 2006, nine
companies from Australia, Canada, USA, India,
Kazakhstan, Russia and China submitted tender
offers; the state-owned China Metallurgical Group
was awarded the contract in November 2007 (Anon-
ymous 2007). Some $2.9 billion was pledged to
Afghanistan to create a mine within 5 years. Envi-
ronmental and socio-economic concerns that were
raised in connection with China’s mining projects
elsewhere add to concerns, which may also include
problems with corruption (Dalton 2007) that are
reportedly endemic in the Afghanistan government
bureaucracies.
In addition to these pronounced successes, assess-
ing the coal resources has shown that Afghanistan has
moderate to potentially abundant supplies, but the coal
is relatively deep or currently inaccessible so that
further development work and access improvement
will be required (Anonymous 2005a). Most of the
supplies are in the more northern regions of the
country, but new areas of potential are also possible in
the southeast in the unruly Pushtun heartland where
production of coal-bed methane gas is also possible.
Finally after many years, with new access to all the
classic Soviet era geology reports, the USGS with the
AGS produced a major series of detailed geology and
resource maps and reports in English, which can
greatly accelerate a host of new resource-develop-
ment projects. This enabled Peters et al. (2007) to
produce a thick compendium assessment of non-fuel
mineral resources in Afghanistan. As has long been
suspected (Shroder 1982, 1983, 1987; Shroder and
Asifi 1987; Shroder and Watrel 1992) the list of
potential revenue-producing deposits is quite good, as
befits its patch-work collage of crustal fragments that
have accreted to the edge of the Asia Plate for several
hundred million years. The preliminary assessments
have resulted in identification of 20 promising
mineralized deposits where future development of
Fig. 2 Location map of Afghanistan showing provinces (from Afghanistan Information Management Service––AIMS, in Kabul)
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the resources is most likely to occur (Table 1). So
most strikingly, after all the predictions of a good
resource base made over the past quarter century, at
last we may presume that if security can be
maintained and corruption suppressed, these
resources, and others as yet undiscovered but pre-
dicted by Peters et al. (2007), could lead to very good
things for Afghanistan’s future economy.
Afghanistan Mines and Minerals Minister,
Mohammed Ibrahim Adil has also announced in fall
2006 that contracts had been agreed upon in the
private sector for the Ghori cement factory, the
Karkar-e-Dodkash coal mine in Baghlan, the Jabal-
suraj cement factory in Parwan, a flourite mine in
Uruzgan, a gold mine in Herat, and a precious-stones
mine in Nuristan. He added that other mines would
also be offered to the private sector (BAAG 2006a).
This is all very good news to the resource-develop-
ment community because always in the past, all such
natural resources from the ground were regarded as
the property of the State and could not be extracted
by individuals, or sold, or exported. Of course they
were anyway, and smuggling and corruption were
rife as a direct result. In this new fashion of
privatization, the new incentives, if coupled with
good and fair tax controls, the results could be quite
beneficial to the economy.
In other reasonably optimistic scenarios, the Asian
Development Bank (2007) and the World Bank
(2005, 2007) have developed various plans to
improve the economy. The Asian Development Bank
(2007) noted especially that the government of
Afghanistan (GOA) had identified four priority
sources of growth: (1) agriculture (fruit, livestock,
agro-processing, rural industries); (2) mining and
extractive industries; (3) sale of public land for
housing and privatization of state enterprises; and (4)
transit trade in goods and energy. Its strategy for the
country and its program updates for 2004–2006 were
comprehensive yet seemingly quite reasonable
(Table 2). The World Bank strategy focuses on: (1)
building capacity and accountability of the state to
ensure the provision of affordable, accessible and
adequate services; (2) improving rural livelihoods
and promoting rural economy; and (3) supporting the
growth of a formal, modern, and competitive private
sector. A detailed breakdown of problems, possibil-
ities, and recommendations has been provided for the
financial sector (Table 3) by the World Bank (2005).
At 162nd place, Afghanistan does, however, rank
lowest in South Asia in ease of doing business there,
so the optimistic scenarios may ultimately have to be
more tempered by reality (World Bank 2007).
Post-conflict environmental assessment
Effective natural resource management and rehabil-
itation have to become a national priority if
Afghanistan is ever to achieve long-term social
stability, much less actual prosperity (UNEP 2003).
Unfortunately and tragically, the combined forces of
warfare, civil disorder, lack of effective governance,
and long, strong drought have taken a major toll on
Afghanistan’s natural and human resources. Long-
term general degradation of the landscape has been
almost everywhere in the country apparent for
centuries since Emperor Babur’s descriptions of
500 years ago (Shroder 1977; UNCOD 1978).
Because of this decline of the natural resource base,
the country’s vulnerability to natural disasters and
food shortages has increased, which adds to the
already uncertain future. UNEP’s (2003) post-conflict
environmental assessment in Afghanistan has
included such vital environmental issues as waste,
sanitation, and pollution ‘‘hotspots’’ in urban areas,
air quality, deforestation, desertification, and surface
and ground water resources.
Waste and sanitation in Afghanistan are famously
problematic; management of liquid and solid waste is
one of Afghanistan’s most serious environmental
problems, and the direct implications for human health
are obvious. UNEP (2003) has noted that the GOA
must develop a national strategy for waste manage-
ment and initiatives for the entire waste cycle from
consumer behavior to final proper disposal. Rampant
medical waste scattered around on the ground, little to
no waste water treatment, open sewer ditches, total
lack of underground sewers or septic tanks, unregu-
lated use of chemicals and hazardous wastes, war-
related chemical damage, unexploded ordinance; all
these factors and many more add to the environmental
degradation, shorten life spans, add to the child
mortality rate that is already among the world’s
highest, and further reduce the ability of the people to
cope with an already difficult situation. Air quality is
similarly problematic in Afghanistan, especially in
urban areas. UNEP’s (2003) recommendations
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Table 1 Preliminary non-fuel resources assessment of Afghanistan (after Peters et al. 2007)
Metals
Copper (Cu)—World-class Aynak, & Darband, Jawkhar, Taghar—Cu is *12.3 MMT.
Additional predicted in Kabul & Logar Basins * 16.9 MMT Cu, 7,670 MT silver (Ag), & 601,500 MT cobalt (Co).
Estimated in Herat, Kandahar, & Zabul Provinces *68,500 MT Cu with auxiliary gold (Au), lead (Pb), & zinc (Zn).
General porphyry copper deposit model in 12 areas, estimates 8 undiscovered porphyry copper deposits containing mean of 28.5
MMT copper, 724,010 MT molybdenum (Mo), 682 MT Au, and 9,067 MT Ag.
Iron (Fe)—World class Haji Gak iron deposit (*2 BMT at 63 to 69 weight (wt.) % Fe) sufficient to support major mining. Additional
deposits totaling 2.26 MMT Fe with greater than 62 wt. %t Fe.
Furmorah skarn deposit 35 MMT at 47 to 68 wt. % Fe, sulphur (S), phosphorous (P), nickel (Ni), & manganese (Mn).
Gold (Au)—Hard rock lode, quartz vein, skarn, & alluvial placers in Badakshan & adjacent Provinces.
West Zabul, Western Ghazni Provinces have measured 1,780 kg of gold.
Takhar & Ghazni Province placers have measured 918 kg Au.
Gold occurrences could support local industry for small- to medium-scale mining.
Lead (Pb) and zinc (Zn) Nalbandon in Ghor Province and Spira in Paktia Province estimated to contain 153,900 MT Pb & Zn.
Darra-i-Nur and Kalai-Assad in Kandahar Province contain *90,000 MT Pb & Zn.
Pb-Zn-Ba-(± Cu, Ag) deposits have potential for local mining.
Tin (Sn) and tungsten (W) abundant in Afghanistan & potentially important in west.
Mercury (Hg) deposits present along 400-km 9 30-km area in southwest Afghanistan mean expected 32,000 MT of undiscovered
Hg, enough to support local industry.
Two other areas in west central and east also contain anomalous mercury zones.
All areas containing Hg also likely have Ag & Au.
Bauxite aluminum (Al). Bauxite aluminum ore at Obato-Shela, Zabul Province and Nalag (Tala), Baghlan Province with 4.5 MMT
bauxite ore grading 50.5 wt. % alumina and *12 wt. % silica. Overall small size, high silica content, and need for plentiful
electricity for refining make bauxite mining soon unlikely.
Industrial minerals
Asbestos in Loghar & Khost Provinces with chromite; estimates give mean of 13.4 MMT of undiscovered asbestos, perhaps sufficient
to support local industry.
Barite (BaSO4) occurs in central Afghanistan, mainly with spatial relation to Pb & Zn. Farenjal Barite deposit in Parvan Province
contains 150 MMT of barite. Quantity probably sufficient for local industry and exploitation of oil and gas.
Borate (HRBO3, where R= Mg, Mn, or Zn) may occur in some young evaporate deposits, and additional study of such environments
recommended.
Celestite (SrSO4) occurs in Baghlan and Kunduz Provinces with speculative resource of 1 MMT ore at about 75 vol. % celestite.
Chromite (FeCr2O4) in Logar and Khost Provinces, with calculated resources of *200,000 MT at *43 wt. % chromium oxide.
Many small podiform chromite deposits. Estimated undiscovered resources expected additional 980,000 MT of chromium oxide.
Total Cr resources might support small-scale industries.
Clays abundant & adequate for local construction. Known resources of kaolin occur in residual and sedimentary deposits mainly in
Baghlan Province totaling *535,000 MT. * 2.2 Mm3 of brick clay present at Deh Kepak deposit in Kabul Province.
Fluorite (CaF2)—occurs in Bakhud, Uruzgan Province. Resources are 8.8 MMT of ore averaging 47 vol. % fluorite. Additional
occurrences in the same region suggest potential for economic deposits sufficient for local consumption.
Gemstones. Originally a major industry as premier source of lapis lazuli; emeralds and rubies from northeast Afghanistan
(Badakshan, Konar, & Nuristan Provinces), including emerald in Panjsher Valley, ruby, sapphire and spinel in Jegdalek, Balal
(Ab-i-Panja), & lapis lazuli at Sar-i-Sang on the Kochka River in Badakhshan Province. Garnet, kunzite, ruby, and tourmaline
gemstones present in many numerous pegmatites. Peridot along Afghanistan–Pakistan border. Many gemstone areas sufficient to
support local industry & major export possible.
Graphite (C) in Archean metamorphic rocks in Badakhshan Province and south of Kabul as disseminated flake graphite. Deposits
small (\5,000 MT), & additional deposits may be located with an expected mean value of 1 MMT. Disseminated flake graphite
could be used locally in handling molten metals and as lubricants.
Gypsum (CaSO4.2H20) is abundant and widely dispersed. Local industries might develop around it, such as cement, wallboard, and
soil enhancement.
Halite (NaCl) is enough salt to support local industry and current internal needs.
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(Table 4), if implemented, could do much to improve
the quality of life for thousands of people.
Deforestation and desertification of Afghanistan
have been progressing apace since Babur’s descrip-
tions, but nowhere is this fact more striking than in
the past three decades of satellite imagery where
direct quantitative comparison can be made. For
example, UNEP’s (2003) polytemporal image com-
parisons allowed a number of case studies (Table 5),
with Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar provinces in the
east showing a 52% decrease in forests between 1977
and 2002. Nangarhar, the province in which both
Jalalabad and the Spin Ghar (Safed Koh) Range are
situated (Fig. 1), was the hardest hit, with a 71%
decrease in forest cover. Takhar and Kunduz prov-
inces in the northeast in 1977 had woodlands
originally of 37–55%, respectively, but such trees
were undetectable by 2002, which may indicate
nearly complete deforestation. Badghis Province in
the northwest has also lost most of its forests,
originally in 1977 with *9 % (tree cover [40%)
and low density woodlands (20% \ tree
cover \ 40%) down to 2002 that by then had \1%
of any form of woodland left. By 2005 only 1.3% or
about 867,000 hectares of Afghanistan was still
forested (Anonymous 2000). In total, between 1990
and 2005, the country lost *34% of its forest and
woodland cover, a striking number that only adds
further emphasis to the unhappy situation of unsus-
tainable despoilation that will continue to bring
adverse pressure on the government in Kabul. UNEP
(2003) has made a series of recommendations
(Table 6), which if implemented even partially,
would do much to alleviate the problems with the
deforestation.
Desertification is another serious problem that has
been progressively increasing in Afghanistan for
centuries (Shroder 1977), as widespread deforesta-
tion, over-grazing, and unmanaged water-well
pumping take their environmental toll. UNEP
(2003) has recommended immediate attention to the
problem (Table 7).
Climate and water resources
Arid Afghanistan lives or dies on its future water
resources; droughts and paralyzing dust storms have
increased in magnitude and frequency in the past
three decades (TSIA 2004). The future does not look
auspicious. Satellite imagery over the past three
decades dramatically documents the problem as lakes
and rivers dry up entirely in some cases. For example,
the Hamoun oasis, at the end of the Helmand River
where it debouches into a series of lakes on the
Afghanistan-Iran border (Fig. 1), has gone though a
series of devastating droughts (Whitney 2006). The
Helmand River ran dry in 2001 (Weier 2002).
Satellite imagery of November 1976 and September
1997 shows full lakes, but in September 1987 all but
one lake was gone, and in October 2001, no lakes
were left (UNEP 2003). These lakes do have the
Table 1 continued
Pegmatites—measured resource of *3.8 MMT of lithium oxide. Abundant pegmatite fields contain lithium, beryllium, quartz,
feldspars, micas, gemstones, tantalum, niobium, and cesium. Could be used for local glass, chemical, or artisanal industries.
Potash (KCl)—important fertilizer, may be in evaporate deposits associated with petroleum resources in north. Mean expected value
of undiscovered potash of 27.5 MMT.
Rare-earth elements (REE) and uranium (U) occur in carbonatite volcano at Khanneshin in Helmand. Quantitative estimation for
undiscovered resources produced mean expected value of 1.4 MMT REE and 3.5 MMT Nb with additional P, U and Th.
Sulfur (S) occurs in Bakhud and Badakhshan Provinces at 450,000 MT. Significant bedded sulfur estimates undiscovered in Afghan-
Tajik Basin give mean 6 MMT.
Talc and magnesite—small ultramafic deposits in Logar Valley & Khost Provinces; larger metamorphic source at Achin south of
Jalalabad is largest in Afghanistan at 1.25 MMT talc and 31,200 MT magnesite.
Building materials
Building and dimension stone. Granite, marble, limestone, travertine (aragonite), & sandstone abundant. Major industry possible if
economic & expertise problems overcome. Limestone suitable for cement in Badakshan, Baghlan, and Herat Provinces.
Sand and gravel. Abundant but unknown quality sand and gravel & rock for crushed stone and aggregate but accessibility problems
due to isolation, urban locations, & lack of infrastructure but adequate for most local industry adjacent to most population centers.
MT, metric tons; MMT, million metric tons; BMT, billion metric tons; Mm3, million cubic meters
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capacity to recover if higher precipitation ever does
return to the highland areas that provide the main
river discharges in the region.
Water-resource assessment, monitoring, and
capacity building to ensure safe, adequate, and
sustainable water resources in Afghanistan has been
a major part of the work of some assistance
agencies, such as the UN (Table 8) and USGS
(Banks 2002; Banks and Soldal 2002; UNEP 2003;
USGS 2006). The recent droughts have dried up a
large number of springs, underground karez, and
wells used for irrigation and domestic supply. In
addition, the indiscriminant and unplanned drilling
of wells has exacerbated the problem and showed
the necessity of developing guidelines for sustain-
able use of the groundwater (Banks 2002; Banks
and Soldal 2002). In the face of these problems the
USGS has implemented a basic monitoring infra-
structure and strategy to assess, understand, and
manage the water resources of Afghanistan. Ironi-
cally this has to be done for a second time by the
USGS after the past two decades of war and the loss
of most of the original records and record-keeping
capacities that they had produced for Afghanistan
originally (Heckmiller 1961; Westfall 1969). An
important new report in this process has been an
inventory of ground-water resources in the Kabul
Basin (Broshears et al. 2005). Other USGS succ-
esses have included detailed studies of the
hydrology of the Helmand Basin (Whitney 2006),
and satellite image analysis of data and information
on snow cover, ice and glaciers that become
meltwater downstream.
Some of this work by the USGS has benefited
from that begun by (Shroder 1980c, 1989b) and
re-energized in the late 1990’s by NASA and USGS
grants to the GLIMS (Global Land Ice Measurements
from Space) Project, in which UNO has become the
GLIMS Southwest Asia (Afghanistan & Pakistan)
Regional Center (Shroder et al. 2005). Terrabytes of
ASTER satellite imagery and other sources have
enabled a series of papers dealing with glaciers of the
region. This has helped define the loss of ice
resources over the past four decades of increasing
drought (Shroder and Bishop 2004, 2008; Shroder
et al. 2005).
Required infrastructure improvements
The infrastructure of Afghanistan has always been
exceptionally poor, and two decades of war have
helped destroy much of what was left. The US
Agency for International Development (USAID
2005), and the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), have been undertaking the
dominant development work (Table 9). Roads, dams,
power lines, buildings; the list is long and only a few
topics are touched on here of particular relevance to
exploiting the natural resources.
Table 2 Country strategy and program update for Afghanistan for 2004–2006 by Asian development bank (BAAG 2004)
• Support to agricultural development, including rehabilitation of irrigation.
• Rehabilitation of electric power infrastructure, with particular attention to repair of power transmission & distribution lines &
substations.
• Support to gas production transmission & distribution.
• Rehabilitation of national roads, including Pul-e-Khumri—Mazar-i-Sharif—Shiberghan section of ring road, & connectors to
Turkmenistan & Uzbekistan. Support to Kandahar—Spin Boldak road (to Pakistan). Feasibility study for Heart—Ankhoy road (the
northwest part of the ring road).
• Rehabilitation of regional airports.
• Support to development of cellular telephone communication system.
• Support to governance process through public service delivery reform.
• Support to financial institutions, including the Afghanistan International Bank.
• Program support for financial market & private sector development.
• Provision of political-risk guarantees to potential investors.
• Support to edible oil processing venture in Mazar-i-Sharif.
• Support to programs aimed to improve air quality in Kabul.
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Table 3 Executive summary of investment climate in Afghanistan (after World Bank 2005)
A. Recent reforms & progress.
1. Afghanistan moving toward politically and economically viable state.
2. Economic growth dramatic during recent recovery.
3. A stable macroeconomic environment is established and steps taken to foster trade.
4. Despite rapid economic growth one of world’s poorest countries is little changed.
5. International assistance funds majority of GOA expenses and almost all development.
6. Government is fostering private sector investment.
B. State of private sector.
1. Long years of conflict destroyed most production capacity and forced flight of many skilled workers and managers.
2. Private investment is limited compared to potential.
3. Overseas Afghans are a potential funding source.
4. Existing firms are performing on par with firms in neighboring Central Asia.
5. Industry’s recovery evidenced by investment activity
6. Industry starts from a low base & most investment is in basic production processes.
C. Today’s Investment Challenges: Investment Climate Constraints.
Overall
1. Government has improved business environment with tax reform.
2. Perceived obstacles are electricity, land access, corruption, & finances.
Security
3. Crime & disorder not ranked as high because accommodations have been made.
4. New investors with no connections to powerful figures find environment daunting.
Infrastructure
5. Infrastructure among world’s worst, even below that of Sub-Saharan Africa.
6. Power is poor and unreliable.
7. War-ravaged transportation network is top priority for repair.
8. Telecommunications are developing rapidly.
Access to factors of production: land, labor, and capitol
9. Land access is serious problem.
10. Skill level is woefully low.
11. Access to finance is highly problematic.
12. Informal hawala financial sources play most important finance role.
Governance: legal framework, judicial & regulatory enforcement, & government functioning
13. The legal framework is weak.
14. Judicial & regulatory enforcement is almost nonexistent.
15. Business registration, tax administration, & labor law are not significant obstacles.
16. Government policies & actions have been predictable.
17. Corruption is endemic.
18. Government institutions are weak.
Trade policy & trade facilitation.
19. Trade policy one of most open in region.
20. Customs administration is arbitrary & corrupt.
21. Trade facilitation services are weak or nonexistent.
22. 38 % of exporters noted transport & customs as main problem.
Dominance of informal arrangements—a vicious circle?
23. Most private sector activity is informal.
24. Informal is useful in short run but negative for overall growth.
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Natural hazards
In addition to the hydrocarbon, mineral-resource, and
hydrological assessments that the USGS accom-
plished over the past five years, it has also played a
major part in providing a foundation for assessment
of earthquake hazards that so bedevil any significant
construction in the country. Reconstruction of the
country’s infrastructure and development of its
natural resources are ever jeopardized by the omni-
present threat of the strong ground shaking, surface
rupture, liquifaction, and extensive landsliding that
strong, damaging earthquakes can produce (Anony-
mous 2005b; Wheeler et al. 2005). The USGS
seismic-hazard assessment involved: (1) compilation
of historical and instrumental records and maps; (2)
seismotectonic maps; (3) study of earthquake source
zones and production of Quaternary fault maps from
satellite imagery (Ruleman et al. 2007); (4) training
of Afghan scientists and technicians; (5) establish-
ment of regional seismographs; and (6) development
of a regional seismic hazard map. Landslide hazards
that occur all across the region had been studied by
Shroder (1989c).
Electric power
Most people in Afghanistan did not have electricity in
the twentieth century, and in the 21st only some 6–7
percent receive a little power, intermittently for
*4 h/day, and 30 percent of all the citizens who
use that power are in Kabul. More than two decades
of armed conflict have largely destroyed the electric
infrastructure, which dramatically reduced consump-
tion, of course. Fraser et al. (2003), writing for the
GOA, have noted that there are some 42 electric
plants in Afghanistan (*19 hydroelectric, *17
diesel, & miscellaneous other), most dating from
before the war, but the ‘nameplate’ electric capacity
of 454 MW was not the actual production in 2003 of
240 W, due to war damage and lack of maintenance.
Because of the lack of a national grid, Strock (2006)
has suggested production of ‘pinpoint’ electric-source
plants (micro-hydroelectric power—.5–150 KW)
planned for rural areas. In fall 2006, agreements
were signed for import of electricity from the three
Table 3 continued
D. Accelerating private investment: what needs to be done?
25. Remove barriers to new entries.
26. Reduce uncertainty & transactions costs; improve access to inputs, business services & markets.
27. Privatization transactions need initiation, implementation & transparency.
28. Infrastructure services need massive investment, reforms in policies, regulations, & institutions, including operation &
maintenance.
29. Broadening & deepening access to finance is required.
30. A sound legal, judicial, & regulatory framework is needed to clarify property rights to enable investment.
31. Improved information flow is required.
32. A fundamental underlying need exists to improve government capacity to assess private sector issues & formulate & implement
private sector development policies & programs.
Table 4 Air-quality improvement recommendations in
Afghanistan (after UNEP 2003)
1. Protect workers.
2. Improve public transport systems.
3. Use cleaner fuels.
4. Increase the use of natural gas.
5. Regularly inspect the transport sector.
6. Institute a central system of heating.
7. Stop uncontrolled burning of wastes.
8. Manage industrial air pollution.
Table 5 Forest decline in a real percent in selected provinces
of Afghanistan, based upon maps made from satellite imagery
from 1976–77 and 2002 (UNEP 2003)
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Central Asian Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgystan,
and Uzbekistan, into Afghanistan and to Kabul, as
well as on to Pakistan (BAAG 2006). Detailed plans
and forecasts of future national electric use have been
drawn up, presumably on the assumption that funding
will become available, and that further hostilities will
be minimal (Fraser et al. 2003). Certainly because of
its location as the head of three major drainage basins
(Indus [Kabul], Turkestan Endorheic [Amu Darya],
Iran-Sistan [Helmand]) (Shroder 1980c), and the
Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan provide plen-
tiful locations for the development of hydroelectric
power plants, and with minimal environmental dam-
age because of the limited biota in the harsh
landscape.
Highways
Another major factor in the redevelopment of
Afghanistan is, of course, the re-establishment of an
efficient highway system that existed (except from
Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat) twenty years ago before the
wars (Fig. 1). These were mostly built by Soviet and
American highway engineers in the 1960s, particu-
larly the ring road from Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar,
Herat, Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif, Salang Pass, and
back to Kabul; from Kabul to Jalalabad and the
Khyber Pass to Peshawar Pakistan; as well as from
Kandahar to Chaman and Quetta, Pakistan; from the
west out into Iran; and from the north into Uzbeki-
stan, and Turkmenistan (Dachiku and Tahir 2002).
The primary highway network was *4,499 km
long, but about half of it in 2002 was in exceptionally
poor condition (good, 14%; fair, 24%; poor 15%;
very poor 47%) and the rehabilitation cost at that time
was estimated to be about *$1677.22 million.
Secondary and tertiary roads connecting provincial
centers are a point of focus, as well as village area
roads (Strock 2006; Nelson 2007; USAID 2007). The
Afghanistan Information Management Service
(AIMS) keeps track of myriad changes in the country
Table 8 Water supply recommendations (after UNEP 2003)
1. Identify and eliminate cross contamination.
2. Stop unmanaged deep well drilling.
3. Protect water-supply sources.
4. Properly equip the water sector.
5. Promote water conservation.
6. Develop national water resources management strategy.
7. Develop national water authority.
8. Promote transboundary water-resources management.
9. Study hydrological contributions of glaciers, permanent
snowfields and snow fall.
10. Consider impacts of climate change.
Table 6 Forestry management recommendations (after UNEP
2003)
1. Undertake immediate soil stabilization measures.
2. Begin community-based reforestation.
3. Reinstate community-based forest warden system.
4. Allocate woodlands to communities.
5. Employ grazing management and rotation systems.
6. Establish community-based woodlots.
7. Establish woodland management legislation.
8. Establish seed banks.
9. Establish woodland protected areas.
10. Develop alternative incomes (managed orchards
& medicinal plant nurseries).
11. Rebuild community control and government influence.
12. Improve transboundary cooperation to stop timber
smuggling.
13. Introduce a timber cooperative.
14. Seek ‘win-win’ outcomes in the use of ‘Green Forces’
by GOA to control forests and local communities
to exploit the resource.
15. Control road access to forests.
16. Estimate future demands.
17. Establish forest-management legislation.
18. Undertake gradual implementation of export controls on
timber harvesting.
19. Institute grazing management and rotation systems.
20. Develop demonstration sites showing the viability
and benefits of forest conservation.
21. Promote strict protection of forest sites as part of national
protected-areas system.
Table 7 Recommendations concerning desertification (after
UNEP 2003)
1. Stabilize sand dunes and soils.
2. Reseed highly degraded rangeland.
3. Reduce grazing and dryland cultivation
in vulnerable areas.
4. Map areas vulnerable to desertification.
5. Create community-based rangeland assessment
and management plans.
6. Establish representative rangeland areas where grazing
is excluded or experimentally controlled.
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Table 9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) progress in Afghanistan in 2007 (after NATO 2007)
Reconstruction and development
$26.8 billion has come to Afghanistan since 2001, including $10.5 billion pledged at the London Conference in 2006.
Health
• 83% of population now has access to medical facilities, compared to 9% in 2004.
• 76% of children \5 years have been immunized against childhood diseases.
•[4,000 medical facilities opened since 2004.
•[600 midwives trained and deployed in every province.
Economy
• GDP growth estimates of 12-14% for the current year.
• Government revenues increased *25% from 2005/06 to 2006/07.
• Per capita income at $355, compared to $180 three years ago.
• Afghanistan one of the fastest growing economies in South-East Asia.
Private sector
• 10% of Afghans own mobile phones, compared to 2 lines per 1000 people in 2001.
• 150 cities across Afghanistan now have access to mobile phone networks and internet provider services.
• Multinationals and internationals operating or showing an interest in Afghanistan include Coca Cola, Siemens, Nestle and Etisalat.
• Evidence of strong consumer demand in Kabul (e.g., road traffic, new shopping malls, new hotels).
Infrastructure
• Over 4,000 km of roads completed.
• Work has begun on 20,000 new homes for Afghans returning to Kabul.
• Over 1 billion m2 of mine contaminated land cleared.
• 17,000 communities benefited from development programs such as wells, schools, hospitals and roads through the National
Solidarity Program (NSP).
Security
• Over 60,000 ex combatants disarmed and reintegrated.
• 35–40,000 officers are serving in the new national police force.
• 30,000 soldiers are serving in the new national army.
Refugees
• 4.8 M have returned so far (3.5 M with the UN’s help).
• UN refugee agency has helped provide [1 million shelters for returning refugees.
Women
• Over a quarter of parliamentarians are women.
• Millions of girls in school with 400,000 new females starting school for first time.
• Over 100,000 women benefited from micro-finance loans to set up own business.
Schools
• Over 7 million girls and boys are in school or higher education.
• 10 universities, against one (barely functioning) under the Taliban.
Media
• 7 national TV stations (6 private); numerous radio networks, plus diverse and increasingly robust and professional print media.
Current status Of PRT projects—Source: ISAF
Regional Command (C) Capitol Kabul—Italy, France, Bulgaria
• Since 2002, 746 CIMIC projects totaling $15.4 M; and 1,565 other major infrastructure projects totaling $1.5 M.
• Since August 2006, RC(C) has built veterinary hospital, sports field, water reservoir, & three wells.
• Several schools repaired & 6 new schools.
• One bridge & two foot bridges.
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and has produced a continuously updated series of
road reconstruction status maps (among a host of
other projects noted below) that show areas that are
being studied, planned, financed and under construc-
tion. The many agencies involved in financing, and in
road reconstruction at the present time include the
EU, World Bank, USAID, the Iranian Government,
Asian Development Bank, Aga Khan Development
Network, Mercy Corps, Partners in Revitalization and
Building, Shelter for Life, and other agencies. Much
remains to be done but it is clear that a good start is
underway.
In addition, the signing of the contract with the
government of China to mine the Aynak copper ore
may also lead to eventual road construction from
China through the Wakhan Corridor and the Panshir
Valley to Kabul. Chinese engineers and workers have
plentiful past experience with such high-altitude,
mountainous endeavors, inasmuch as their great skill
at such work enabled construction of the paved
Karakoram Highway (KKH) through northern Paki-
stan in the 1970s (Ispahani 1989). A similar road-
building effort into the Wakhan from the nearby
KKH in southwestern China would be relatively
simple and would lead to accelerated truck trade
between the two countries by bypassing the existing
Pakistani choke points.
Pipelines
Afghanistan is located between the oil and natural gas
reserves of the Caspian Basin of Turkmenistan and
the Indian Ocean so the country has been considered
as a possible energy transit route for many decades,
with a recent proposal being that of Unocal’s during
the Taliban years that was cancelled in 1998 when the
US fired cruise missiles into bin Laden’s al-Qaeda
terrorist training camps. Most recently in 2002 the
Asian Development Bank has studied the proposed
1,460-km Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (or TAP) that
would tap into [2.83 trillion m3 of natural gas
reserves at Turkmenistan’s huge Dauletabad–Don-
mez field and deliver it across Afghanistan to both
Pakistan and, perhaps, India (Fig. 1). The pipeline
would carry up to 20 billion m3 of gas a year, which
would generate $100–300 million per year in transit
fees for Afghanistan and create thousands of jobs.
The project was to start in 2006, but the cost of the
pipeline would be *$3.5 billion, and this cost and
the uncertain security in the country has precluded its
Table 9 continued
• Since August 2006, 14,000 Afghans have received medical assistance, ranging from the distribution of simple medication to the
most sophisticated procedures.
Regional Command (E) Bagram—USA
• Since 2002, 1,376 PRT projects totaling $504.8 M, and 14,388 other major infrastructure projects totaling $2.7 M.
• Since October 2006, 200 km of roads were built.
• Thanks to school repair and construction work, 35,000 students accommodated during various school shifts.
Regional Command (N) North—Germany
• Since 2002, 1,054 PRT projects totaling $31.5 M, and 6842 other major infrastructure projects totaling $2.2 M.
• 185 ongoing R&D projects totaling $6.5 M in 2007. R&D for 2007 is $21.3 M.
Regional Command (S) South—United Kingdom
• Since 2002, 1,362 PRT projects totaling $175.3 M, and 4,150 other major infrastructure projects totaling $1.8 M.
• Repair of Kajaki Dam in Helmand aimed at providing power to 1.7 million people, irrigation to farmers, jobs to thousands within
the next 2–3 years.
• The major Gerishk–Sangin–Kajaki road-building project started and progressing north.
• ANA patrol bases and 18 new permanent security check points being constructed.
Regional Command (W) West—Italy, Spain
• Since 2002, 1,369 PRT projects totaling $160.7 M, and 3,218 other major infrastructure projects totaling $2.7 M
• In 2006, $64 M were invested in reconstruction and development and $216 M spent on the construction of the Herat-Farah ring
road.
• In 2007, R&D budget for PRTs amounts to $42 M.
ISAF, International Security Assistance Force; PRT, Provincial reconstruction teams; M, million
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construction up to now. In addition, President
Niyazov of the Russian gas company, Gazprom, in
Turkmenistan has expressed doubt about the project,
the price has not been established, a consortium to
handle the project had not yet been created, and
priority could be given to Russia instead of Afghan-
istan (BAAG 2006).
The Soviet Union had constructed several pipe-
lines in Afghanistan, the first in 1967 to exploit the
natural gas of Shibarghan and send it north across the
Amu Darya River into the pipelines of Turkmenistan
(Shroder 1983), and later during the Soviet–Afghan-
istan War, the Soviets constructed a small diameter
pipeline south to the Bagram military base to provide
fuel for their troops. These pipelines are, however,
known to have been in disrepair and disuse for a
number of years.
Railroads
New concepts about establishment of a first real
railroad system into Afghanistan have remerged
recently. These ideas were much discussed in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Baker
1917), but Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, ruler of
Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901, always thought that a
railway would be used for invasion. So as long as he
was in power he resisted such construction, referring
to the British railroad line to the south border near
Chaman as ‘‘a knife pushed into my vitals.’’ From
1923 to 1929, however, was the only time that
Afghanistan ever had an actual railway, and that was
only 7 km from central Kabul City southwest to
Darulaman Palace as a showpiece under the brief
reign of the enlightened and western-oriented King
Amanullah (Grantham 2006). Otherwise only a few
short connectors ever came barely over the border
from the surrounding countries seeking to facilitate
more efficient transport.
A variety of different routes have been looked at
over the years, including an old secret British survey
from Torkam at the Afghanistan (northeast) side of
the Khyber Pass through Jalalabad, up to Surobi, and
then up the Panjshir River valley and across it on a
high bridge to Bagram and then back south to Kabul
(N. Allan, email correspondence, 11/27/2006). Most
prior plans bring such a railway in from the south
through Quetta and Chaman in Pakistan, over the
Afghanistan border at Spin Baldak, and thence to
Kabul in the northeast, as well as Kanadahar and
Herat in the west, with connections into Iran to the
west and Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to the north.
Some plans included Mazar-i-Sharif in the north and
even a link from Kabul tunneled through the Hindu
Kush, to complete what could turn out to be a very
useful ring line.
In 2008 then, after more than a century and a half,
Afghanistan seems much closer to a real railroad that
could help bring resources to market. Numerous web
and newspaper reports over the last few years
detailing financial assistance from the nearby coun-
tries of China, Iran, Pakistan, India, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to construct rail lines
through Afghanistan have recently been announced
(Synovitz 2007; Hussain, 2005).
Conclusion
The USA severely failed to measure up with a
Marshall Plan at the end of the Soviet–Afghanistan
War and even abandoned the country after the
Afghan Resistance had helped win the Cold War.
Coupled with such lackluster development in the
post-9/11 world, these failures provide a strong
argument that the USA and its NATO allies should
use the resources and plans expressed on this paper as
a major means to build up Afghanistan. Anything less
would be reprehensible and incomprehensible, now
that the relatively rich resource base is fairly well
understood.
In sum there are many positive indicators that
reasonable development is not only possible, but is
underway in Afghanistan, in spite of the many
roadblocks and great initial expense required for
success. A resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda appear to
reflect in part the initial indecisive nation building
and developmental lethargy. A strong national
resource base, suggested for many years but now
proven, offers room for optimism, providing insur-
gent violence, corruption, and environmental
degradation can be kept to a minimum. Only
continued firm commitment by the multi-national
consortia and their militaries, coupled with well-
controlled donations, will keep Afghanistan from
slipping back into the chaos so desired by the
backward and violent jihadi Islamicists.
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